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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: A
Need for Technical Innovation
Elizabeth J. Goldstein*
A class action, governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
may be viewed as litigation in the aggregate; it permits a small
number of individuals to represent the interest of a group. Litigation
in the aggregate presents unique challenges. The drafters of Rule 23,
however, eschewed this uniqueness and integrated class actions into
the framework of traditional single-party litigation. As the 30 years
of case law demonstrates, their effort has resulted in the straining of
traditional litigation principles and the blurring of duties between
class representatives and class counsel. The attempt to graft
aggregate litigation into the framework of traditional single-party
litigation has often resulted in the unsuccessful forcing of a square
peg into a round hole.
To assimilate class actions into the traditional litigation
framework, Rule 23 has created class representatives who formally
stand in the shoes of individual litigants and class counsel who acts
on behalf of the class.1 Adequate representation is seen as a
replacement for individual control over the litigation.2 If the
representation is not deemed adequate, then class members are not
bound to the judgment.3
The drafters of Rule 23, perhaps in an attempt to gain a
consensus, refused to answer the most rudimentary question of group
litigation-who is ultimately responsible for representing the
underlying group, class counsel or the class representatives? Those
* B.A., The Pennsylvania State University; J.D., Northeastern University
School of Law. The author is an attorney in the Harrisburg office of Powell,
Trachtman, Logan, Carrie, Bowman & Lombardo.
1. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 913, 938-39 (1998) ("[P]erhaps the [class representative] preserve the
comfortably familiar appearance of more traditional litigation.").
2. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,41-43 (1940).
3. See id. at 45-46.
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interpreting the rule, the commentators and the courts, have not
reached a consensus on this fundamental issue. Without clear
parameters of their respective roles and without clearly defined
discovery and dispute resolution procedures, it is not surprising that
many commentators have lamented that both class counsel and the
named representatives shirk their responsibility to the class, and
instead act in their own self-interest.4 In short, when everyone is
responsible, no one acts responsibly.
Class action jurisprudence must now evolve into its own distinct
jurisprudence with its own rules of professional conduct. Class action
jurisprudence should be viewed as a technological innovation. Only
by creating a unique set of rules for class actions may practitioners
adequately harness the innovation of aggregate litigation.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the stages of
technological innovation and explains why further innovation of
Rule 23 is necessary. Part II examines the purposes of group
litigation and sets forth the Achilles' heel of Rule 23, its refusal to
determine who ultimately represents the class: the class
representatives, representatives who formally stand in the shoes of
individual litigants, or class counsel.6 Part III establishes that the
courts' efforts to assimilate group litigation into the traditional bi-
polar framework has not been seamless, and the courts, like the
drafters of Rule 23, have not reached a consensus on the roles and
responsibilities of the class representatives, class counsel and the
absent class members. Part IV explains why class action
jurisprudence must also include its own rules of professional
responsibility.
Finally, Part V recommends amendment of Rule 23; an
amendment which would precisely define the roles of class counsel
and class representatives in the management and administration of
4. See Edward W. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIz. L.
REv. 923, 927-28 (1998); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of
Settlement, 82 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1111-15 (1996); see also In re Factor VII or IX
Concentrate Blood Productions Litig., 159 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding the
trial court's injunction against class counsel for accepting more fees than were
permitted under the class action settlement).
5. The class representative is the party who sues on behalf of individuals with
common claims. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 43.
6. See Jean Wegman Bums, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class
Representatives in Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 181 (1990); Mary Kay Kane,
Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEx. L.
REV. 385,395-97 (1987).
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group litigation. It also encourages the construction of technical
innovations for group litigation. It advocates the development of a
unique litigation framework for class actions; one which does not rely
upon the traditional bi-polar model. In addition, Part V recommends
the creation of rulemaking designed to effectuate the specific
purposes of aggregate litigation.
I. The Role of Technological Innovation
Class action jurisprudence should be viewed as a technological
innovation. Technology is defined as "the science of the applica-
tion of knowledge to practical purposes"7 or "the application of
knowledge to improve something."8 Class actions created a new
form of litigation by permitting parties to aggregate their interests
in a single action. The drafters of Rule 23 used their knowledge of
bi-polar litigation to create a new type of litigation.
The evolution of class action jurisprudence should mirror other
technologies. The three stages of technological innovation are
outlined by John Naisbitt in his book Megatrends;9
There are three stages of technological development: First, the
new technology or innovation follows the line of least resistance;
second, the technology or innovation is used to improve
previous technologies (this stage can last a long time); and third,
new directions or uses are discovered that grow out of the
technology itself.
During the first stage of technological innovation, technology
takes the path of least resistance, that is, it is applied in ways
that do not threaten people-reducing the chance that the
technology will be abruptly rejected.
The way society handled the introduction of microprocessors is
a classic example of this first stage. The first application of the
microprocessor was in toys. Who could object? Robots were
first used in jobs considered unsafe or too dirty for humans.
Who could object? Robots (for dangerous tasks) and toys
representing the unthreatening path of least resistance.
7. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY (1986).
8. Todd H. Flaming, Principles for Evaluating Technology, 84 ILL. B.J. 525,
525 (1996).




Today [1982] we have moved into the second stage of
development: The microprocessor is being used to improve what
we already have-cars, manufacturing, sewing machines.
Today's word processor is nothing more than an improved
typewriter. 10
Microprocessors in 1999 have reached the third stage; they have led
to new directions or uses which grow out of the technology itself.
The car is another technological innovation that illustrates
Naisbitt's time line.
Consider the term "horseless carriage." Blinded by what came
before them, the inventors of the automobile could not see the
huge change it would have on how we work and play, how we
build and use cities, or how we derive new business models and
create new derivative business. It was hard, in other words, to
imagine a concept such as no-fault insurance in the days of the
horse and buggy.1"
Class action jurisprudence, in its present state, represents both
the first and second stage. First, the drafters of Rule 23 created
group litigation in the image of traditional bi-polar litigation. Since
bi-polar litigation is the norm, this modeling logically resulted in the
least resistance from the bench and the bar. In essence, Rule 23
attempts to improve upon bi-polar litigation by offering it in the
aggregate. It was not an attempt to create a new litigation model; it
was merely an attempt to apply the traditional litigation concepts to
a group format.
II. The Intent and Structure of Rule 23
Rule 23 promotes several different policies. It permits small
claims to be brought in the aggregate when it would not be cost-
effective on an individual basis." The Rule allows weak and
vulnerable members of the class to combine forces and litigate. 3 It
deters inconsistent adjudication of like claims, and consequently,
10. Id.
11. Beyond Digital, WIRED, December 1998, at 288.
12. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 923-24; Greenfield v. Villager Industries, Inc.,
483 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1973).
13. See Phyllis Tropper Bauman, et. al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure:
The Integration of Substantive Law In Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REv. 211,253 (1992).
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fosters the tenets of equal justice and fundamental fairness. It also
allows the litigation of claims that are innately group claims." Rule
23 sets forth the class action prerequisites into two sections, sections
"a" and "b". Each section's requirements must be met before a
class is certified. Section (a) focuses upon the characteristics of the
class; it requires numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
of representation." The numerosity and commonality requirements
focus upon the class as a whole.
Section (b) analyzes the substance of the litigation. Under
23(b), a class is appropriate for certification when separate actions
by individual class members "would create a risk of inconsistent or
varying adjudications" which (1) "establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class;" 6 (2) "would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests; ' 17 (3) "the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class;" '8 or (4) "a common question of law or fact predominates
over any other question facing the class." 19 Most (b)(3) actions seek
monetary damages from a defendant who has allegedly damaged
the group."
Section (a) provides the innate contradiction that this Article
addresses. The first requirement listed in section (a) is numerosity.
This requirement mandates that the number of class members
involved be too numerous to join under traditional joinder rules."
The second, commonality, requires that class members' claims
share common questions of law or fact. The typicality and
adequacy of representation requirements, on the other hand,
pertain to when a small group of litigants may proceed on behalf of
the class. The typicality and adequacy requirements illustrate the
drafters' refusal to select from conflicting theories of group
representation when they constructed the modern class action.'
14. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 929-33.





20. Infrequently, Rule 23(b)(3) is used to certify a defendant class. See HERBERT
NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.66 (3d ed. 1992).
21. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(1).
22. See id. 23(a)(2).
23. See STEPHEN C. YEARELLE, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACTION 250 (1987).
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Two competing political theories address how groups are most
effectively represented. One political view is to require that the
individual(s) representing the group possess the same interests as
those he or she represents.24 For example, a farmer should be
selected to represent other farmers in the community. This school
of thought espouses that the group representative's self-interest
should be united with the group's interest. In other words, it
requires "perfect typicality."25
The second political theory argues that group representation is
most effective when the group representative(s) serve as
professional representatives of the group. In other words, the
representative is a trustee and guardian of the interests he or she
represents.26 Professional lobbyists are an example of this type of
representation. This theory espouses a perfect trustee model of
representation.
The drafters of Rule 23 refused to rely solely on either theory
and attempted to infuse both models into the Rule even though
both are mutually exclusive. Rule 23 has adopted both the "perfect
typicality" and "perfect trustee" models of group representation.
In addition, Rule 23(a)(3) requires that "the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class."27  Section (a)(3) adopts the perfect typicality model
requiring that the class representative possess claims typical of the
group. The Rule, however, does not find that perfect typicality is
sufficient to ensure fair group representation. Section (a)(4)
specifies that the representative parties must "fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class."28  This section, in contrast to
(a)(3), appears to suggest that a trustee, if adequate, is sufficient to
represent the class.
Sections (a)(3) and (a)(4) are incongruent. Professor Stephen
Yearelle cogently explains, "[i]f one concluded that typicality, while
an additional assurance of adequate representation, was not
essential if other indicia of adequacy existed, one would accept an
otherwise adequate representative., 29 However, Professor Yearelle
adds that if the drafters of Rule 23 indeed adopted the perfect
24. See id. at 208, 250-51.
25. Id. at 208.
26. See id. at 204.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
28. Id. 23(a)(4).
29. See YEARELLE, supra note 23.
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trustee model, then there was no need for the drafters to require
perfect typicality.3" The drafters instead tied two inherently
contradictory theories together.
The courts have attempted to eliminate the inherent tension
between the (a)(3)'s typicality requirement and (a)(4)'s adequacy
requirement by applying these requirements to two different actors.
Courts require that class representatives be "typical" and class
counsel "adequate." This solution, however, simply displaces the
tension;3' Rule 23 never addresses the question of who is ultimately
responsible for representing the absent class members, the class
representatives (those who possess perfect typicality) or class
counsel (those who serve as the trustee). 32  The Rule fails to
delineate the respective roles of the class representatives and class
counsel and fails to provide adequate guidance on their
interrelationship.33
Furthermore, class action jurisprudence has failed to resolve
these basic issues. Instead, courts frequently set forth contradictory
expectations for the class representative and class counsel.34 For
instance, the Third Circuit in Goodman v. Lukens Steel stated:
In a massive class action such as the one at hand, it is counsel for
the class who has the laboring oar. The class representatives
furnish the factual basis to involve the jurisdiction of the court
and provide the outline of the controversy, but the lawyers
shape the claims for adjudication by the compilation of factual
and expert testimony and the presentation of statistical and
documentary evidence.35
30. See id.
31. See id. at 251.
32. See id. at 251-52.
33. See, e.g., Linney v. Cellular Alaska Partnership, 151 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th Cir.
1998) (addressing both the adequacy of counsel and the class representatives); In re
Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[Tjhere is often
no clear allocation of the decision-making responsibility between the attorney and his
clients."); In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 1984)
(Adams, J. concurring) ("[N]o clear allocation of decision making responsibility has
emerged between the attorney and class members.").
34. Several commentators recognize these contradictory expectations. See, e.g.,
Bums, supra note 6, at 167 ("Class action jurisprudence is confused and inconsistent
when it comes to defining the role of class representative .... Apart from filing a
space on the caption of the complaint, the purpose served by the named plaintiffs
presence remains a largely unanswered question."); Kane, supra note 6, at 389.
35. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 124 (3d Cir. 1985), affd on other
grounds, 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
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In contrast, in Gill v. Monroe County Dept. of School Services, the
court warned the class representatives that they must take an active
role; they were required to "question the class attorney to ensure
that counsel is adequately performing [its]... job."36
Rule 23's refusal to choose among competing theories of group
representation is a policy failure. Both class representatives and
class counsel are unsure of their roles. This obscuring of roles may
result in neither party adequately protecting the interests of the
class.
The next Part discusses cases, by issue, which illustrate Rule 23
and the class action case law's failure to delineate the roles of class
counsel, class representatives, and even absent class members. This
Part also establishes that Rule 23 and the courts have not
determined who ultimately represents the class-class counsel or
the class representatives. This issue emerges when class counsel
and the class representative disagree upon the fundamental
decisions such as whether to settle or to appeal.
III. Mixed Messages
A. Who Is Really In Charge, the Class Representatives Or Class
Counsel?
1. Questions of Appeal-In the litigation of individual
claims, the individual client alone decides whether to settle the case
or appeal it once the court has rendered its verdict.38 When class
counsel and the class representatives cannot agree upon these
fundamental questions, the court must answer the question left
unanswered by Rule 23- who actually represents the class? The
courts facing this issue have not answered this question by resolving
the doctrinal tensions inherent in Rule 23(a)'s typicality and
adequacy of representation requirements. Instead, the courts have
found that the individual facts and circumstances of the case will
36. 92 F.R.D. 14, 16 (W.D.N.Y. 1981).
37. See Cooper, supra note 4, at 927-28.
38. This discussion assumes that class counsel is not also the class
representative. Interestingly, courts are split on this very issue. Some have found
that class counsel can never serve as class representative. See e.g., Zylstra v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978); Kramer v. Scientific Control
Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1090-92 (3d Cir. 1976), Turoff v. May Company, 531 F.2d
1357, 1360 (6th Cir. 1976). However, others have not found a per se ban to exist.
See, e.g., Phillips v. Joint Legislative Con. 637 F.2d 1014, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981);
Susman v. Lincoln American Corp. 561 F.2d 86, 93-94 (7th Cir. 1977).
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determine which actor may represent the class. In other words,
they have determined that the role and responsibility of the class
representatives and class counsel differ depending on the facts of
39the case.
For example, in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., the
court was faced with the question of whether the class attorney or
the class representative should determine whether to appeal the
lower court's decision.41 In Pettway, a Title VII discrimination case,
the class attorney was at odds with the class representatives and
many absent class members regarding the lower court's decree
granting injunctive relief and back-pay.42  The three class
representatives, together with 28 out of the 30 individuals on a
committee elected by the class to represent them in the litigation,
requested that class counsel appeal the court's judgment.43  Class
counsel found that the lower court's judgment was the best possible
result under the circumstances, so he informed the class that he
would not appeal the judgment.' The active-named plaintiffs then
sought to replace class counsel with new counsel who would4'ti41
proceed with an appeal.45 The lower court denied this motion.46
The appellate court was faced with the question of who should
determine whether an appeal was in the best interest of the class.47
The appellate court was reluctant to place the decision solely in
the hands of the class attorney or class representatives.' The court
explained its reservations concerning reliance exclusively upon the
class attorney, because of the possible conflicts of interest between
the attorney and the class. 49 For instance, an appeal may not be
39. Another issue is the question of what right absent class members have to
appeal when class counsel and the class representative both agree that no appeal
should be taken. Some courts have found that absent class members have no absolute
appellate rights. See, e.g., Croyden Assoc. v. Alleco, Inc., 969 F.2d 675, 679-80 (8th
Cir. 1992); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1013 (10th Cir. 1993); Walker v. City of
Mesquite, 858 F.2d 1071, 1073 (5th Cir. 1988); Guthrie v. Evan, 815 F2d 626, 628-29
(11th Cir. 1987).
40. 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978).
41. See id. The objectors may always appeal the class action settlement. See, e.g.,
Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins., 861 F.2d 159, 162 (7th Cir. 1988); cf. In re
Prudential Ins. Co. American Sales Litig., 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998); Hanlan v.
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998).
42. See Pettway, 576 F.2d at 1172-95.
43. See id. at 1175.
44. See id. at 1175, 1175 n.17.
45. See id. at 1175.
46. See id.
47. See Pettvay, 576 F.2d at 1176.




desirable to an attorney who has been awarded a substantial fee by
the lower court.0 Nevertheless, the court found that leaving the
decision exclusively with the class representatives was equally
unsatisfactory because their interests could also diverge from those
of the absent class members.' The court stated "[w]ere the class
attorney to treat the named plaintiff as the exclusive client, the
interest of other class members might go unnoticed and
unrepresented.... In such a situation, the attorney's duty to the
class requires him to point out conflicts to the court so that the
court may take appropriate steps to protect the interests of
absentee class members."52
The court resolved this issue by remanding with the
requirement that the lower court make the final decision after
consideration of several factors:
Among the factors that should be considered by the court are
(1) the adequacy of representation of the named plaintiffs,
including any apparent or potential conflicts of interest they
might have with the remainder of the class, (2) the extent to
which other class members support or oppose the appeal, and
the extent to which an appeal may be necessary to protect the
interests of absent class members, (3) the adequacy of
representation provided by the class attorney and any conflicts
of interest between the class attorney and the class, and (4) the
reasonableness of the decision to appeal, including an
assessment of the possibility of success on the merits.53
The Pettway test is puzzling. First, if the class representatives
are deemed adequate and without conflict, why must the court
move beyond this factor? Second, the lower court is required to
assess the level of class support for the appeal. Rule 23 provides no
mechanism for this assessment. Moreover, other cases indicate that
class decisions should not be based on majority rule. 4 Third, it is
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See Petnway, 576 F.2d at 1176.
53. Id. at 1178.
54. For example, courts are not directed to conduct a settlement referendum as
part of the approval process. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Consequently, settlements
are not deemed unfair or unreasonable simply because a large number of class
members oppose it. As the Third Circuit has explained:
While the proportion of the class opposed to a settlement is one factor to
be considered in assessing its fairness, a settlement is not unfair or
unreasonable simply because a large number of class members oppose it.
The drafters of Rule 23 chose as a means of protecting the class the
requirement that the district court approve the settlement. They did not
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unclear how the court is to weigh each factor. Must each be given
equal weight? What result is mandated where the outcome of the
tests under each factor are in conflict? Last, it places the lower
court in the untenable and unusual position of reviewing the merits
of an appeal of its own decisions. This is nonsensical.
2. Questions of Settlement-In Saylor v. Lindsley, the
Second Circuit faced the question of whether class counsel could go
forward with a settlement when the class representative (plaintiff in
a shareholder derivative action) offered opposition to the plan.5
Like the Pettway court, the Second Circuit refused to issue a bright-
line rule 6 It held that while the class representative's assent is not
always necessary for class counsel to settle the case, the class
representative's rejection of the settlement should be considered
carefully by the court. 7 Interestingly, the court did not object or
comment upon class counsel's failure to represent the class
representative's position.
The Second Circuit found that placing the decision solely in the
hands of the class representative "would put too much power in a
wishful thinker or a spite monger to thwart a result that is in the
require rejection of a settlement on objection of a given part of the class.
Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 803 (3d Cir. 1974) (citation
omitted). In fact, courts have approved settlements where a significant amount of
class members have objected. See County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co.,
907 F.2d 1295, 1325 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that majority opposition to a settlement
does not serve as an automatic bar to the settlement); Van Horn v. Trickey, 840
F.2d 604, 606 (8th Cir. 1988) ("[A] settlement may be approved over a significant
percentage of objections from the class members.") (citations omitted); Reed v.
General Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 171-72 (5th Cir. 1983) (approving a
settlement where over 600 of the 1,469 notified class members objected); Cotton v.
Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331-35 (5th Cir. 1977) (approving the class action
settlement over objections of counsel alleging to represent nearly 50% of the
class); League of Martin v. Milwaukee, 588 F. Supp. 1004, 1022 (E.D. Wis. 1984)
(approving the settlement over 108 objectors out of a class of 200).
In assessing a settlement, the court is not a vote-tallier but instead serves as a
trustee for the absent class members. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up
Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 785 (3d Cir. 1995) affd, 34
F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Under Rule 23(e) the district court acts as a fiduciary
who must serve as guardian of the rights of absent class members.") (citations
omitted).
55. 456 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1972) (shareholder derivative action). While
shareholder derivative actions have been taken out of Rule 23 and given their own
rule, see CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1821 (West 1986), the case is illustrative because it was treated as a class action. In
fact, "[i]t has always been clear that most derivative actions can qualify as class
actions ...." Id.
56. See Saylor, 456 F.2d at 897.
57. See id. at 899-901.
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best interests" of the class." Nonetheless, the court found class
counsel's assent was also insufficient because it recognized that
class counsel's interests and those of the class were incongruous. 9
The court explained that class counsel's interest in maximizing his
or her fee often presents a conflict of interest between class counsel
and the class.' Therefore, the court was reluctant to leave the
decision in either party's hands, and directed the lower court on
remand to allow the class representative through different counsel
to delve more deeply into the facts underlying the case.6 The
Circuit Court deferred to the district judge on whether the class
representative could proceed with his own discovery and whether a
hearing was needed.62 The court provided little concrete guidance
to the lower court when it stated that the proposed settlement could
be approved but "only after thorough consideration of what the
parties will present although less than a trial." 63
Like the Pettway court, the Second Circuit refused to
determine who was in control of the class's destiny, the class
representative or class counsel. Moreover, it did not provide the
lower court with any directions on how to weigh the competing
position of the class representatives and class counsel.
Since Rule 23 does not impart an overarching doctrinal theory
of the class action lawsuit, failing even to define who is ultimately
responsible for the direction of the litigation, it is no surprise that
courts have not developed a satisfactory answer either. This leaves
both class counsel and the class representatives in limbo, with no
party ultimately responsible for the difficult decisions in the case.
6
As is discussed in the next section, the question of who ultimately
represents the absent class members is further complicated when
courts address this problem in the context of attorney-client
privilege issues.
5& See id. at 900.
59. See id. at 900-01.
60. See id.
61. See Saylor, 456 F.2d at 904.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 905 (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also Linney v.
Cellular Alaska Partnership, 151 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998) (identifying
without comment that only two of the three class representatives supported the
settlement).
64. In rejecting the views of the class representatives, the attorneys in Pettway
and Saylor acted with the belief that they represented the class as a whole not the class
representatives. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1175 (5th
Cir. 1978); Saylor, 456 F.2d at 898.
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B. Who Does Class Counsel Represent, the Class Representatives,
the Class, or Both?
1. The Attorney-Client Privilege: A Further Conundrum-
When attorney-client privilege65 questions arise in class action
lawsuits, courts once again must determine the representative role
of class counsel and class representative. Attorney-client privilege
questions force the court to look at the basic issue from a different
angle: the court must determine who class counsel represents-the
absent class members, the class representatives, or both.
Doctrinally, if class counsel represented only the class represent-
atives, then discussions between absent-class members and class
counsel should fall outside the privilege and be unprotected.
Again, courts have not reached a consensus on this issue.
After reversing itself on a motion for reconsideration, an
Oregon district court in Penk v. Oregon State Board of Higher
Education found that absent class members were not parties to the
lawsuit and thus not represented by class counsel.' In Penk, the
defendant sought to obtain information contained in questionnaires
sent out by class counsel to employee class members involved in a
discrimination suit." The questionnaire promised confidentiality
but stated that class counsel were not the attorneys for individual
class members.' The Oregon district court found that absent class
members were neither parties to the litigation nor clients of class
counsel, and thus no attorney-client privilege attached.69
Consequently, the privilege did not shield the communications
between class counsel and absent class members even though the
questionnaire promised confidentiality.7 ° The court, however, did
attempt to shield absent class members from retaliation by their
employer by limiting access to information obtained from the
questionnaires and by prohibiting the production of the
questionnaire itself.7
65. The purpose of the attorney client privilege, is "to encourage full and frank
communications between attorneys and their clients and thereby to promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice."
UpJohn Company v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
66. See Penk v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education, 99 F.R.D. 511, 516 (D.
Or. 1983).
67. See id.
68. See id. at 517
69. See id. at 516-17.
70. See id. at 517.
71. See Penk, 99 F.R.D. at 517.
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Other courts, have reached contrary holdings, and have found
that class counsel represents the absent class members, whose
communications thus are protected by the attorney-client privilege.
This line of cases has held that opposing counsel could not contact
absent class members, nor could he or she discover the
communications between class counsel and absent class members.
For instance, a Massachusetts district court protected commun-
ications from absent class members to class counsel via
questionnaires because the absent class members were reasonably
led to believe that class counsel represented them.72 In contrast to
the questionnaire in Penk, this questionnaire included a cover letter
that indicated that class counsel represented the absent class
member's legal interests." Since this cover letter indicated that
class counsel represented the absent class members, the court held
that the attorney-client privilege prevented defendant from
obtaining the questionnaires through discovery.74 Instead, the court
required plaintiff to furnish the defendant with all relevant factual
information gained from the questionnaires but did not require
plaintiff to identify the source of that information.75
Courts have also found the per se existence of an attorney-
client relationship between class counsel and absent class
members.76 For instance, an Illinois district court ruled that a
defendant could not directly communicate with plaintiff class
members to prepare for trial. The court reasoned that class
counsel had a fiduciary duty to represent the absent class members,
and thus, once the class was certified, absent class members were
represented by class counsel. Pursuant to the Code of
Professional Responsibility,79  the defendant could only
72. See Connelly v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 339,342 (D. Mass. 1982).
73. See id.
74. See id. at 342.
75. See id.
76. The Second and Third Circuit have also indicated that the class attorney
represents the class as a whole albeit in examining a different issue. See In re
Agent Orange Product Liability Litig. 800 F.2d 14 19 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[C]lass
attorney's duty does not run just to the plaintiffs named in the caption of the case;
it runs to all of the members of the class."); In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig.,
748 F.2d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 1984) (Adams, J., concurring) ("The obligation of
counsel representing a class runs to the class as a whole, although as a general
matter class counsel may have worked closely only with the named parties.").
77. See Resnick v. American Dental Association, 95 F.R.D. 372 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
78. See id. at 376.
79. The court cited to DR 7-10(a)(1) (1980) of the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY.
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communicate with absent class members in the presence of class
counsel.8°
Likewise, an Indiana appellate court found that the class
counsel represented absent class members, thus a blanket of
attorney-client privilege protection existed.81 Yet, unlike the court
in Resnik it expanded the scope of the attorney-client privilege and
found that it attached prior to class certification. The court held
that privilege attached upon the initial meeting between a large
group of class members and prospective class counsel." The court
reasoned:
Where, as here, a group of individuals meet with attorneys
concerning potential litigation, and the purpose of that
consultation is to provide legal advice regarding rights and
liabilities, we conclude that any communications made in
furtherance of that purpose are "confidential communications"
between attorney and client and carry with them an expectation
of confidentiality.
We see no reason to fashion a different rule of privilege for a
group of prospective clients than for the single prospective client
who seeks the advice of counsel to determine his legal rights and
obligations.
83
The fact that the meeting consisted of a large group of
strangers did not destroy the reasonable expectation of
confidentiality.' If it did, the court concluded that it would hamper
prospective class members from gaining necessary legal information
because group consultations are the only feasible way to impart this
information.85
The cases discussed thus far address whether attorney-client
privilege shields communications between those involved in class
representation (i.e. class counsel, class representatives) and
opposing or third parties. This, however, leaves open the question
of privilege among class counsel, class representative, and absent
class members. In other words, is class counsel's communication
80. See Resnick, 95 F.R.D. at 377.
81. See Corll v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 646 N.E.2d 721, 724-26 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995).
82. See id. at 724.
83. Id. at 725.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 726.
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with the class representative protected from discovery by absent
class members? 6 This issue is likely to emerge when absent class
members object to a class action settlement and seek to discover
whether the class representatives and class counsel impermissibly
colluded with the opposing party to settle the lawsuit. At least one
commentator considered this issue at some length.'
The question of whether the attorney-client privilege protects
communication between class counsel and class representatives
from disclosure to absent class members illustrates how Rule 23's
failure to develop a single, philosophically consistent approach
complicates and confuses many other class action issues. One
commentator analyzing the privilege issue recognizes that if the
attorney-client privilege can be used by class counsel and the class
representatives as a shield, then the privilege undercuts the absent
class members' ability to monitor the class.' Thus, the
commentator advocates what the author views as an exception to
the attorney-client privilege-the permitting of absent class
members to gain access to communications between class counsel
and class representatives when good cause is shown by providing
information that raises serious doubts as to the adequacy of
representation. 89 In this situation, the commentator found it was
appropriate and analogized the exception to that adopted in the
context of shareholder derivative actions by the Fifth Circuit' in
Garner v. Wolfinbarger." In Garner, the court lifted the attorney-
client privilege protection of communications between the
corporate representatives and counsel when good cause was shown
by the stockholder plaintiffs.92  The court reasoned that the
privilege should be lifted in such cases because the corporation
owed a fiduciary duty to the stockholders. 93
86. Indeed, this issue may also arise in another intra-class setting. The
question may arise whether an individual class member's communication with class
counsel is protected with respect to the class entity. See Shapiro, supra, note 1, at
939 ("Similarly, though communications between individual members and the class
lawyer may be both appropriate and necessary, the interests of the class may well
preclude such communications from being considered privileged with respect to
the class as a whole.").
87. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Class Actions: Fashioning An
Exception to Promote Adequacy of Representation, 97 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1994).
88. See id.
89. See id. at 960.
90. See id. at 956-57
91. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
92. See Garner, 430 F.2d. at 1101.
93. See id.
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With courts in disagreement over whether class counsel
directly represents absent class members, it is not surprising that
courts have not reached a consensus on whether discovery may be
propounded upon absent class members. To determine the answer
to this question, one must decide whether absent class members are
parties to the action. As is discussed in the next section, consensus
is equally absent on this basic question.
C. Opposing Party's Ability to Contact Absent Class Members: Are
Absent Class Members Represented by Class Counsel?
When a class action case is brought, defendants may seek to
either eliminate or limit the scope of claims by negotiating
separately with the absent class members. The propriety of this
defense strategy is unresolved.94 For example, in the case of In re
General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, GM, the
defendant in the class action litigation, sought to offer directly to
individual class members a settlement rejected by the court.95 The
Seventh Circuit found it permissible for GM to make such a direct
offer.' Implicit in this ruling is the Seventh Circuit's finding that the
absent class members were not parties to the litigation represented
by class counsel. If they were, direct communications with absent
class members would presumably be barred.
D. Are Absent Class Members Parties to the Action?
1. Propounding Discovery on Absent Class Members-Often
the party opposing the class will seek discovery upon absent class
members through the use of interrogatories or request for
production of documents pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 33 and 34. Rules 33 and 34 allow parties to propound
interrogatories or requests for production of documents only upon
other parties.' Consequently, while attorney-client privilege
questions do not always arise with the use of these discovery tools,
the court must once again determine whether absent class members
are parties to the litigation. If class counsel represents the class
94. See American Finance System, Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572 (D. Md.
1974) (permitting defendant to send offers of settlement to putative members of
the class).
95. See In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106,
1138-39 (7th Cir. 1979).
96. See id. at 1138-1141.
97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33, 34.
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representatives only, then logic would dictate that absent class
members are not parties to the litigation. However, courts faced
with the discovery issue have not attempted to answer the
representation question and have instead made decisions on an ad
hoc basis.
The vast majority of courts facing this question have reached a
doctrinally inconsistent result. Explicitly98 or implicitly,99 such courts
have found that absent class members are parties subject to discovery
under Rules 33 and 34."° However, they have also held that a strong
showing is required before discovery of absent class members is
compelled. °' These courts fail to justify their departure from the
Rules 33 and 34, which is an unambiguous policy subjecting all
parties to interrogatories and requests for production of
documents.' 2
Courts that find discovery appropriate under Rules 33 and 34
generally allow interrogatories and document requests when the
following factors are present:
(1) where the information requested is relevant to the decision
of common questions, (2) when the discovery requests are
tendered in good faith and are not unduly burdensome, and (3)
98. See Enterprise Wall Paper Mfg. Co. v. Bodman, 85 F.R.D. 325, 327
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 260, 264 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
99. See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Clark v.
Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 340-41 (7th. Cir. 1974); Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 1971)
(upholding lower court's discovery requests); Dubin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.,
No. 88 Civ. 0876 (PKL), 1992 WL 6164 at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1992);
Transamerican Refining Corp. v. Dravo Corp., 139 F.R.D. 619, 620-22 (S.D. Tex.
1991); Town of New Castle v. Yonkers Contracting Co., Inc., No. 88 Civ. 2952
(CES), 1991 WL 159848, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. August 13, 1991); Renovitch v.
Stewardship Concepts, Inc., No. 84 C7727, 1987 WL 14688, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. July
23, 1987) (recognizing that absent class members are generally permitted a "free
ride"); Vernardo Chafee v. A&P Tea Co., No. 2735, 79 C3625, 1987 WL 9308, at
*1-2 (N.D. Ill. April 6, 1987); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 67 F.R.D.
691, 699-701 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gardner v. Awards Marketing Corp., 55 F.R.D. 460,
463 (D. Utah 1972).
100. Interestingly, absent class members are treated as parties for some
procedural requirements but not others. For instance, each class member must
meet the amount in controversy requirement. See Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973). Nonetheless, the courts solely concern themselves
with the class representatives when determining diversity, personal jurisdiction,
and exhaustion of remedies.
101. See Dellums, 556 F.2d at 187; Clark, 561 F.2d at 340-41; Town of New
Castle, 1991 WL 159848, at *1 ; In re Folding Carton, 83 F.R.D. at 264; Gardner, 55
F.R.D. at 463.
102. See cases cited supra notes 98-99.
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when the information is not available from the class
representative parties.'
Interestingly, some courts in dicta have provided that when
discovery is directed to absent class members, absent class members
must seek their own attorney to aid them in responding to the
discovery requests."° Underlying this finding is the conclusion that
class counsel represent only the class representatives. The Gardner
court cited the fact that absent class members would have to seek
their own counsel as one of the reasons supporting its reluctance to
permit this type of discovery. Consequently, the issue of
representation and party status are intertwined. The Gardner court's
ruling leaves the absent class members in the unenviable position of
having to pay class counsel to represent the class representatives and
having to hire their own counsel to represent themselves if, for
instance, they are deposed.
A minority of cases, on the other hand, hold that absent class
members can never be considered parties for discovery purposes
under Rules 33 and 34.16 To do so their reason would undermine
the class action's effectiveness. It would subvert the purposes of
Rule 23 by requiring absent class members to directly participate in
the litigation instead of allowing the representative parties to
shoulder this responsibility.
2. Use of Discovery by Absent Class Members-When a
settlement is reached between the class representatives and the
opposing party, members of the absent class may object to the
settlement. The question then arises whether absent class members
may use discovery tools to gain ammunition from either party to
fight the court's adoption of the settlement.1
7
The courts that have considered this issue have found generally
that absent class members who object to a class action settlement do
not have an absolute right to discovery:
103. Transamerican Refining Corp., 139 F.R.D. at 621-22 (citing Dellums, 566
F.2d 167; United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 101 (D.D.C. 1976).
104. See Clark, 561 F.2d at 341 (finding that absent class members who are
deposed require their own independent counsel); Gardner, 55 F.R.D. at 466.
105. See Garnder, 55 F.R.D. at 466.
106. See Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1555-57 (11th Cir.
1986); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Fisher v.
Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
107. The purpose of seeking objections from absent class members is to alert a
trial court to divergent views and aid the court in identifying possible inadequacies
in the settlement. See Stanley v. Darlington County School Dist., 879 F. Supp.




While objectors are entitled to "meaningful participation" in the
settlement proceedings, [citation omitted] and "leave to be
heard," [citation omitted] they are not automatically entitled to
discovery or "to question and debate every provision of the
proposed compromise.'08
With no absolute right, objectors must establish a need for the
discovery.
Generally, courts will allow objectors discovery rights only when
the settlement occurred after little or no discovery, or when the
settlement agreement was not negotiated at arms length:
Assuming that the evidence presented in support of settlement
was the result of a truly adversarial proceedings, the necessity
for additional evidence is inversely proportional to the amount
and nature of the discovery previously undertaken. [Footnote
omitted.] As the comprehensiveness of the record submitted by
the proponents increases, the likelihood that the objector's
request for discovery would be duplicative of the efforts of the
proponents increases. In other words, as the comprehensiveness
of the records developed by the proponents increases, the
objector has a greater burden to show the necessity of additional
evidence.1 0
Hence, general requests for discovery are usually denied
because the objectors cannot establish the necessity for additional
discovery. For instance, one court has explained:
[I]t is uncontradicted that appellants did not seek discovery
prior to the hearing, or seasonably request additional time to
prepare for examination of witnesses. Instead, appellants made
a general request for discovery at the hearing, and declined to
examine the parties that were present at the hearing. Moreover,
the appellants did not utilize the opportunity prior to the
hearing to marshal any evidence indicating that the settlement
should not receive court approval or to analyze in any way the
vast amount of evidence already in the record .... Thus, we
reject [the] contention [that appellants should have been
granted discovery and the right to cross examine witnesses at
the settlement hearing]."'
108. In re General Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075, 1084 n.6 (6th
Cir. 1984) (citation omitted); see also City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F.
Supp. 677, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (reviewing a consent decree under the principles
governing class action settlements).
109. NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 20, at § 11.57 (citations omitted).
110. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 489 F.2d 262, 264 (3d Cir. 1973).
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When class members object to a settlement, they are granted the
right to pursue discovery to support their position only when a court
finds that adequate discovery was not completed by the class
representatives, or when there is a question whether the settlement
was a true bi-product of the adversary process. While parties to
litigation have the right to discovery when it is reasonably likely to
lead to admissible evidence, absent class members' right to discovery
is conditioned upon the stage of the litigation at the time of the
settlement and the apparent adversarial nature of the settlement
negotiations.11' It seems that the strictures of this analysis may, in
some cases, undermine the policy behind allowing for objections by
absent class members.
IV. The Professional Rules of Responsibility & Professional Rules
of Conduct: Not Applicable to Class Counsel?
While many commentators have blasted class counsel for failing
to consider class interests paramount, the previous section establishes
that even conscientious counsel may stumble because the role of
class counsel is not clearly defined. Even more troubling, courts have
found that the rules governing attorney conduct do not necessarily
apply to class counsel.
Recently, the Third Circuit found that the Rules of Professional
Conduct could not be applied automatically to class counsel. In Lazy
Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., former class representatives objected to the
proposed class settlement."' These objectors then moved to
disqualify class counsel arguing that class counsel had a conflict of
interest because the objectors, who were previously class represent-
atives, had been represented by class counsel in their former
capacity."' In analyzing this argument, the Third Circuit examined
the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
Responsibility. However, the court declined to strictly apply them
to the facts of the case.1 The court explained:
In many class actions, one or more class representatives will
object to a settlement and become adverse parties to the
remaining class representatives (and the rest of the class). If, by
111. In a minority of cases, objectors are permitted to depose the class
representatives to determine their adequacy but it is unheard of for objectors to
have the opportunity to depose class counsel. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 4,
at 1109.
112. 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 178 (1999).
113. See id. at 588-89.
114. See id. at 589.
115. See id. at 589-90.
2000]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
applying the usual rules on attorney-client relations, class
counsel could easily be disqualified in these cases, not only
would objectors enjoy great "leverage," but many fair and
reasonable settlements would be undermined by the need to
find substitute counsel after months or even years of fruitful
settlement negotiations. "Moreover, the conflict rules do not
appear to be drafted with class action procedures in mind and
may be at odds with the policies underlying the class action
rules.""6
The court then held that
once some class representative objects to a settlement
negotiated on their behalf, class counsel may continue to
represent the remaining class representatives and the class, as
long as the interest of the class is in continued representation by
experienced counsel is not outweighed by actual prejudice to the• •117
objectors of being opposed by their former counsel.
In its discussion in Lazy Oil, the Third Circuit cited"8 Bash v.
Firstmark Standard Life Insurance."9 In Bash, the Seventh
Circuit, in dicta, stated that the rules governing attorney
conduct cannot be mechanically applied to class counsel.1
Williams, class counsel in Bash, moved on behalf of the class
representatives for the trial court's acceptance of a proposed
settlement.12 ' The trial court approved the settlement122
Subsequently, Williams appealed the settlement on behalf of
several objectors.12 1 On appeal, the defendant raised the
propriety of Williams's change in position.12' The Seventh
Circuit determined the appeal on the merits rather than "get
entangled in collateral issues."'21 However, it did indicate in
dicta that rules governing attorney conduct could not be strictly
applied in a class action:
When all is said and done, Williams has represented two sides of
the same case, the defense of the settlement before the district
116. Id. at 589 (quoting Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The
Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 127 (1996)).
117. Id. at 590.
118. Id.
119. 861 F.2d 159 (7thCir. 1988).
120. See id. at 161.
121. See id. at 160.
122 See id.
123. See id.
124. See Bash, 861 F.2d at 161.
125. Id. at 162.
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court judge, and the attack on the settlement in this court. But
conflicts of interest are built into the device of the class action,
where a single lawyer may be representing a class consisting of
thousands of persons not all of whom will have identical
interests and views. Recognizing that strict application of rules
on attorney conduct that were designed with simpler litigation in
mind might make the class-action device unworkable in many
cases, the courts insist that a serious conflict be shown before
they will take remedial or disciplinary action. Such a conflict
has not been shown here.
126
The Seventh Circuit, like the Third Circuit, thus indicated that
the Rules of Professional Responsibility cannot adequately serve as
guideposts for class counsel.
The Second Circuit has also found that the Rules of Professional
Responsibility cannot always be utilized in the class action setting. In
the case of In re Agent Orange Products Liability Litigation, the
Second Circuit found that former class counsel could represent a
group of objectors.127 Like the Third and Seventh Circuits, the
Second Circuit reasoned that a rigid approach to the conflict rules
would result in the disqualification of class counsel every time
objections were asserted."
The above cases suggest that aggregate litigation cannot be
shoe-horned into the standard professional conduct rules, and
consequently, new rules should be established for class counsel.
While the Restatement is in the process of creating such rules,12 9 all
state professional codes should consider the ethical issues unique to
class actions and create rules to guide class counsel.
V. Recommendations
As seen from the above discussion, class action jurisprudence
has not developed into a philosophically consistent approach. The
root of this inconsistency is Rule 23's basic indecisiveness -its failure
to determine which party is ultimately responsible for representing
the group, the class representatives or class counsel. The courts have
looked to both parties to represent the absent class members, but
have not set forth clear guidelines for the parties to follow when they
disagree. This in turn blurs the responsibilities of class counsel and
126. Id. at 161 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
127. 800 F.2d 14, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1986).
128. See id. at 18.
129. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 156A
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997).
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class representative, promoting intentional and unintentional
betrayals of the class interest.
The drafters of Rule 23 essentially refused to recognize that
group litigation cannot always be squeezed into the traditional
litigation framework with the traditional rules governing attorney
conduct. Without analyzing the systemic effects of their decisions,
the courts eschew clear mandates of the discovery rules set forth in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and have instead created
common law procedural rules on a case-by-case basis. What is left is
a disorganized patchwork, a patchwork that provides almost no
guideposts to those participating in a class action, and thus allows the
class representatives and class counsel to misconceive or actively
shirk their respective responsibilities to the class.
The challenge is how to develop a coherent and consistent set of
guideposts to apply, so that the parties to a class action can proceed
with the assurance that the fundamental purposes of class action
litigation will be effectuated. First, potential future drafters must
recognize the vast limitations of Rule 23, and amend the rule to
explicitly set forth the respective duties of each party. Either one
party could be ultimately responsible for all decisions or each party
could be specifically assigned different responsibilities. This will
provide class representatives, class counsel, and the court the proper
perspective and criteria to assess the effectiveness of those involved.
Future drafters should also consider completely redesigning the
Rule and adopting a procedural framework specifically created for
group litigation. For instance, drafters should examine whether class
representatives are needed or whether they are simply a vestige of a
traditional two-party litigation model. Crafting rules specifically for
class actions will allow the drafters to consider and determine how
best to harness the powers of aggregate litigation. After all,
procedural rules must be written to effectuate underlying policy
concerns. In other words, form must follow purpose.
As Eugene J. Meehan, a professor of political science and public
policy administration explains:
Human performance can be criticized or improved only by
reference to the purpose(s) that performance is meant to
achieve. The proposition is readily tested, for it asserts that no
individual, engaged in any kind of activity, whether physical or
mental, can assess performance quality until the purpose of the
performance is known.
130
130. EUGENE J. MEEHAN, THE THINKING GAME: A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE
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Hence, when creating new rules tailored to class actions, one
must consider first the purposes of class action lawsuits and then
ask whether each proposed innovation would further these
purposes. This is not to say that any single innovation must
promote every identified purposes; however, each innovation
should be evaluated in relation to the stated purpose.
When thinking of class action litigation as a discrete area of
jurisprudence one can unlock creativity and create procedural rules
specifically designed to enhance class action litigation. For instance,
Professor Bums, who has recognized the need to develop "class
action jurisprudence specifically tailored to... the problems of group
litigation' '13' has suggested that the job of class representative be split
among two different groups, "class monitors" and "exemplary class
members." '132 Professor Bums would not require class monitors who
were typical; instead, the monitors would be individuals or entities
that could effectively monitor class counsel, such as a nonmember
organization with a special interest in the litigation. 133 The exemplary
class members would be typical members of the class and would be
presented to the court prior to class certification. '34 These exemplary
class members would allow the court to determine whether a case or
controversy exists."'
We have in fact experimented with nontypical class
representatives. Courts have allowed class representatives to remain
even though their claim became moot.13' After their claims were
moot, the class representatives were in essence serving as appointed
trustees, rather than typical class representatives.
In 1996, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States set forth several
proposed changes to Rule 23 and asked for comment.138 With the
exception of the proposal to allow for permissive interlocutory
appeals, the 1996 proposal has not been adopted. 139 More recently,
STUDY 4-5 (1988).
131. Burns, supra note 6, at 191.
132. Id. at 194-202.
133. See id. at 196.
134. See id. at 1994-95.
135. Article III requires a case or controversy, not individual or representative
litigants. See Burns, supra note 6, at 187.
136. See id. at 194-95.
137. See, e.g., United States Patrole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404
(1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393,402 (1975).
138. For a detailed discussion of the proposal and comments thereto see
Cooper, supra note 4; Koniak & Cohen, supra note 4, at 1134-40.
139. See Cooper, supra note 4, at 924.
20001
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
however, Senators Chuck Grassley, Herb Kohl, and Strom
Thurmond have introduced legislation, The Class Action Fairness
Act of 1999, to curb class action abuses." The Act seeks, among
other things, to require class counsel to notify the attorney generals
of states in which class members reside when a settlement is
proposed and to limit class counsel's attorney fees. 4' Nonetheless,
these proposed amendments are interim piece-meal solutions that
will not solve the fundamental inadequacies of class action
jurisprudence as it currently exists.
While creating a detailed model of the optimal solution is
beyond the scope of this Article, the Burns model illustrates how
abandoning the traditional litigation structure opens our minds and
permits us to improve upon group litigation by designing a unique
litigation framework.
It is hoped that this Article will inspire others to develop
procedural innovations specifically designed to improve upon current
aggregate litigation practices. Such creative solutions will form the
basis for further discussion and will allow our legal system to harness
the true power of aggregate litigation.
VI. Conclusion
The rules governing aggregate litigation should evolve as
technological innovations. Our 30 years of experience with Rule 23
allows us to now take the next step. It is now time to create a new
litigation framework specifically designed to harness the capabilities
of group litigation. This new framework must discard the require-
ments of conventional litigation, now an anachronism, such as
providing class representatives to serve as surrogates for plaintiffs
and defendants, and instead, concentrate on how group litigation can
best be accomplished.
140. See S. 353, 106th Cong. (1999).
141. See id.
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